We survey de nitions, known results, and open questions in the area of locally random reductions and explore the rami cations of these reductions in complexity theory.
Introduction
We consider the question of whether a probabilistic polynomial-time machine A can compute a function f in the following manner. A interacts with one or more machines B 1 , : : :, B k that are not restricted to probabilistic polynomial time. At the end of the interaction, A can use the information obtained from the B i 's to compute f(x). However, the information that A sends to the B i 's is locally random. Informally, this means that no individual B i can use it to gure out what A's private input x is.
This study can be motivated by the practical problem of using shared resources for private computations. For example, f may be a nancial service provided, for a fee, by the B i 's, and x may be A's personal nancial position. Alternatively, the B i 's could be publicly supported supercomputing facilities, and A could be one of many competing scientists trying to use them without revealing sensitive data.
The focus of this paper, however, is on another motive for studying locally random reductions, namely their importance in complexity theory. For instance, they provide a way of relating the worst-case complexity of one function to the average-case complexity of another. Suppose that each of the B i 's computes the function g. On input x, the machine A produces random instances in Dom(g) according to some polynomial-time sampleable distribution D and feeds them to the B i 's. From the B i 's answers to these random instances, A can compute f(x) in polynomial time. Thus, if there is an algorithm for g that is fast-on-average, with respect to the distribution D, there is a randomized algorithm for f that is fast in the worst case. If f = g, then f is hard on average, with respect to D, if it is hard in the worst case. More generally, locally random reductions play an important role in what I refer to informally as interactive complexity theory. By this, I mean complexity-theoretic questions about models of computation involving interaction between two or more computers, in which these computers (usually) have di erent amounts of resources; topics in this theory include interactive proof systems, program checking, and program self-testing and -correcting.
Among the issues we must answer in formalizing these notions are the following.
1. What does it mean to say that A's input x is not revealed to the B i 's? Suppose that some subset of the B i 's collude { how big do the coalitions have to be in order to have enough information to recover x? 2. How many random queries must A ask? In particular, how big does k have to be if x is of size n? 3. How many rounds of interaction must A have with the B i 's? Are there functions f for which A can ask all of the random questions at once, or must A always follow an adaptive strategy, basing later questions on answers to earlier questions?
4. How powerful must the B i 's be? For example, if each B i computes the function g, what is the relationship of the complexity of g to that of f? When can we take g = f? 5. Suppose that there are multiple rounds of interaction. Does B i 's answer in round q have to be based only on A's question in round q, or can it be based on the questions in rounds 1 through q? That is, when should B i also follow an adaptive strategy?
This paper surveys de nitions, known results, and open questions in the area of locally random reductions and explores the rami cations of these reductions in complexity theory. One of the main purposes of this paper is to establish a uni ed notation and terminology with which to state what is known; therefore, some of the results from the literature are stated here in di erent terms from those used by the original authors.
We end this introduction with two standard examples. These examples arise in the theory of cryptography, e.g., in cryptographic protocols for probabilistic encryption GM], pseudorandom number generation BlMi] , and zero-knowledge proof systems GMR].
Example 1.1 The Discrete Logarithm Function:
Let p be a prime, g a generator of the cyclic group Z p , and u an element of Z p . The discrete logarithm function f maps the triple (u; g; p) to the unique e 2 0; p ? 1] such that u g e mod p. How could a probabilistic polynomial-time machine A obtain f(u; g; p) without revealing u? First, A chooses an exponent c uniformly at random from 0; p ? 1]. A then computes v u g c mod p and obtains e 0 = f(v; g; p). The discrete logarithm e of (u; g; p) is just e 0 ? c mod p ? 1. Because c is uniformly distributed over 0; p ?1], v is uniformly distributed over Z p , and the random instance (v; g; p) reveals no information about u. 
Terminology and Notation
Each function considered in this paper is de ned on some in nite domain I. There is a sequence of subdomains I 1 , I 2 , : : :, such that I = n 1 I n and a constant c such that, for all x 2 I n , n 1=c jxj n c , where jxj is the number of bits in some suitable binary encoding of x. For example, we may have I = f0; 1g + and I n = f0; 1g n , in which case we can take c = 1. If p n is an n-bit prime, then I n may consist of n-tuples of elements in GF(p n ), in which case we can take c = 2. We refer to elements of I n as \inputs of size n." So \size" is a generalization of binary length.
By a probabilistic polynomial-time machine M, we mean a machine that has access to a source of unbiased random bits and always halts in a xed polynomial number of steps, but may output a wrong value. (Thus we do not mean a machine that always outputs the correct value but can only be guaranteed to halt in expected polynomial time.) If M is a probabilistic polynomial-time oracle machine, we use the notation M f (x) for the output of M when it is run with input x and an oracle for the function f. Note that M f (x) is a random variable. If Q is a program that purports to compute f, then the notation M Q (x) has the natural meaning; if Q is a probabilistic program, then the output distribution is determined by the algorithms and the coin-toss sequences of both M and Q.
The probabilistic polynomial-time oracle machine M is a downward self-reduction for f if, for all n and all x 2 I n , M f (x) = f(x) with probability at least 3=4, and all oracle queries that M makes on input x are of size less than n.
A set S = (A; B 1 ; : : :; B k ) of private-input, interactive Turing machines is de ned as follows. The input x, which is of size n, is given only to A { that is the sense in which the set of machines is \private." The parameter k(n) is a polynomially bounded function of n; thus, there are really an in nite number of B i 's, but A only interacts with k(n) of them on inputs of size n. 
Basic De nitions
Throughout this section x is the input to a randomized reduction, n is the size of x, and ran is a string chosen uniformly at random from f0; 1g w(n) , where w is some polynomially bounded function of n. The parameters k (for the number of powerful players) and r (for the number of rounds) are also polynomially bounded functions of n.
De nition 3.1 A nonadaptive k(n)-locally random reduction (abbreviated \k-lrr") from f to (g1; : : : ; gk) is a pair of polynomial-time computable functions and with the following properties.
(1) For all n and all x 2 I n , f(x) = (x; ran; g1( (1; x; ran)); : : :; gk( (k; x; ran)));
for at least 3=4 of all ran's in f0; 1g w(n) , and (2) For all x 1 and x 2 of size n and all i 2 f1; : : :; kg, if ran is chosen uniformly at random, then (i; x 1 ; ran) and (i; x 2 ; ran) are identically distributed.
Note that there is no bound on the complexity of gi with respect to the complexity of f. It is actually straightforward to show that there is no loss of generality in requiring that g1 = = gk, but it is convenient in some proofs to allow the gi's to be di erent.
De nition 3.2 A nonadaptive k(n)-random-self-reduction (abbreviated \k-rsr") for f is a nonadaptive k-lrr from f to (f; : : :; f).
The word nonadaptive in De nitions 3.1 and 3.2 refers to the fact that the querier produces all of the random queries in one round; that is, (i; x; ran) does not depend on gj( (j; x; ran)) for j 6 = i. The next two de nitions cover the case in which the querier A follows an adaptive strategy, but the powerful players B 1 , : : :, B k are functional.
De nition 3.3 An r(n)-round, adaptive k(n)-locally random reduction from f to (g1; : : : ; gk) is a set S of private-input, interactive Turing machines (A; B 1 ; : : :; B k ) with the following properties.
(1) For all i, 1 i k, the i th powerful player B i is functional and computes the function gi.
(2) For all n, the number of rounds of interaction on inputs of size n is at most r(n).
(3) For all n and all x 2 I n , Prob((A(x); B 1 ; : : :; B k ) = f(x)) 3=4:
(4) For all x 1 and x 2 of size n and all i 2 f1; : : :; kg, the random variables Trans S (x 1 ; i) and Trans S (x 2 ; i) are identically distributed.
De nition 3.4 An r(n)-round, adaptive k(n)-random-self-reduction for f is an r(n)-round k-lrr from f to (f; : : :; f).
Finally, we consider a type of reduction in which both the querier A and the powerful players fB i g are allowed to use randomized, adaptive strategies. De nition 3.5 An r(n)-round, k(n)-instance-hiding scheme (abbreviated \k-ihs") for f is a set (A; B 1 ; : : :; B k ) of private-input, interactive Turing machines that satisfy properties (2) through (4) of De nition 3.3 but do not necessarily satisfy property (1). That is, in an instance-hiding scheme, the powerful players B i may be adaptive.
Property (2) in De nitions 3.1 and 3.2 and property (4) in De nitions 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5 are referred to as the instance-hiding property. This means that the querier is successful in hiding everything about the instance x, except its size, from each individual powerful player. It can also be called the local randomness property: From the local viewpoint of each powerful player, the communication received from A looks random; from the global viewpoint (i.e., that of someone who sees all of the messages received by all of the players), the communication may reveal x. Note that the instance-hiding property is not required to hold if the powerful players cheat. That is, queries in later rounds may reveal more than the size if the querier constructs them using wrong answers from earlier rounds.
There are two more parameters that are often added to these de nitions in order to make them more general: the privacy parameter t(n), which is a polynomially bounded function of n, and the leak function L, which is de ned on Dom(f Defaults:
1. Unless otherwise speci ed, the leak function L(x) is assumed to be n, the size of x. 2. Unless otherwise speci ed, the privacy parameter t(n) is assumed to be 1. That is, each powerful player learns at most L(x) in isolation, but if 2 or more of them collude, they may learn x. 3. Unless speci ed, both k and r are assumed to be arbitrary polynomials. 4. If only one target function g is speci ed in a locally random reduction, it means that g1 = = gk = g.
5. Unless speci ed, a reduction is allowed to be adaptive.
For example, an \rsr for f" is a 1-private, poly(n)-round, adaptive poly(n)-rsr for f that leaks at most n; a \nonadaptive k-lrr from f to g" is a 1-private, nonadaptive k-lrr from f to (g; : : :; g) that leaks at most n. Example 1.1 shows that the discrete logarithm function is nonadaptively 1-rsr, leaking at most g and p. Example 1.2 shows that the quadratic residuosity function is nonadaptively 1-rsr, leaking at most m. Question 3.6 Is there a nontrivial leak function L such that integer factoring is rsr leaking at most L?
In all of the reductions de ned in this section, as well as some that we de ne later, the upper bound on the error probability is given as 1=4. It can always be made exponentially small by increasing the number of queries by a suitable polynomial factor. This is done by running independent copies of the reduction and taking the plurality of the answers to be the output. The proof that the error bound goes down exponentially is a standard argument using Cherno bounds.
A reduction is called size-preserving if, for all inputs x 2 I n , all of the random queries made are of size at most n.
Instance-hiding schemes were rst studied in AFK]; there, they are called \encryption schemes for functions," and only schemes with one powerful player B are considered. The term \instance-hiding scheme" rst appeared in BeaF], which is the rst paper to prove anything about schemes with multiple powerful players. The term \locally random reduction" rst appeared in BFKR], where it refers to what we here call a \nonadaptive locally random reduction."
Random-self-reducibility and its e ect on the relationship of average-case complexity to worstcase complexity was used in the design and analysis of cryptographic protocols at least as early as BlMi, GM] . It was rst de ned formally and studied in its own right from a complexity theoretic point of view in AFK]. The de nitions of rsr that we use here are almost identical to those in FF].
4 Low-Degree Polynomials Let f : f0; 1g ! f0; 1g be an arbitrary boolean function, and let f n : f0; 1g n ! f0; 1g be the restriction of f to inputs (x 1 ; : : :; x n ) 2 f0; 1g n . For any nite eld K n , there is a unique multilinear polynomial g n 2 K n X 1 ; : : :; X n ] that represents f n over K n { i.e., g n agrees with f n on all inputs (x 1 ; : : :; x n ) in f0; 1g n . In this paper, K n is always a eld of size at least n+1. The polynomial g n has a standard explicit formula with some important computational properties. Let x = (x 1 ; : : :; x n ) be an arbitrary element of K n n and y = (y 1 ; : : :; y n ) be an arbitrary element of f0; 1g n . g n (x) = X y2f0;1g n y (x)f n (y) (1)
For x 2 f0; 1g n , the monomial y (x) is 1 if y = x, and it is 0 otherwise. We call g n the arithmetization of f n over K n and g = fg n g n 1 the arithmetization of f over fK n g n 1 .
The following basic result, due to Beaver and Feigenbaum, is the starting point for most of the positive results discussed in this paper.
Theorem 4.1 BeaF]: Let f = ff n g n 1 be an arbitrary boolean function, fK n g n 1 be a sequence of nite elds such that jK n j > n, and g = fg n g n 1 be the arithmetization of f over fK n g n 1 . Then f is nonadaptively (n + 1)-lrr to g.
Proof: Recall that g n 2 K n X 1 ; : : :; X n ] is of total degree at most n. The reduction proceeds as follows. Let 1 , : : :, n+1 be distinct elements of K n . Choose coe cients c 1 , : : :, c n independently and uniformly at random from K n . Let (i; (x 1 ; : : :; x n ); ran) = (c 1 i + x 1 ; : : :; c n i + x n ) for 1 i n + 1.
Consider the one-variable polynomial G de ned by G(Z) = g n (c 1 Z + x 1 ; : : :; c n Z + x n ):
Note that G is of degree at most n and hence determined by its values on n + 1 distinct values of Z. If y i = (i; (x 1 ; : : :; x n ); ran), then G satis es
It also satis es G(0) = g n (x 1 ; : : :; x n ): The function of the lrr interpolates the n+1 values ( 1 ; G( 1 )); : : :; ( n+1 ; G( n+1 )) to recover the polynomial G and outputs the constant term.
Beaver and Feigenbaum stated this theorem using the term \instance-hiding scheme." The term \locally random reduction" was later introduced in BFKR], where it was pointed out that the construction in BeaF] was actually a locally random reduction.
Lipton subsequently observed that the Beaver-Feigenbaum construction also shows that lowdegree multivariate polynomials are themselves nonadaptively rsr. He also pointed out that the permanent function for matrices over nite elds is a low-degree polynomial. This has implications for the complexity class #P, as we shall see in Section 6. Lipton uses the term \randomly testable" for what we here refer to as \random-self-reducible." Theorem 4.2 Li]: If g n 2 K n X 1 ; : : :; X n ] has total degree d n and jK n j > d n , where d n is bounded by a polynomial in n, then g = fg n g n 1 is nonadaptively (d n + 1)-rsr. In particular, if K n = GF(p n ), where p n > n, and g n is the permanent of n n matrices over K n , then g n is nonadaptively (n + 1)-rsr.
The following improvement of Theorem 4.1 is due to Beaver, Feigenbaum, Kilian, and Rogaway. Theorem 4.3 BFKR]: Let f = ff n g n 1 be a boolean function, t(n) a polynomial, and fK n g n 1 a sequence of nite elds such that jK n j > nt(n)= log n. Then there is a family h = fh n g n 1 of multivariate polynomials over fK n g n 1 such that f has a t(n)-private, nonadaptive (1+(nt(n)= log n))-lrr to h.
Proof: The proof is divided into two lemmas. Lemma 4.4 Every boolean function f = ff n g n 1 is polynomial-time, many-one reducible to a family h = fh n g n 1 of multivariate polynomials over K n , in which h n is of total degree n= log n. Lemma 4.5 Let t(n) and d(n) be polynomially bounded functions and fK n g n 1 be a sequence of nite elds with jK n j > t(n) d(n). Let h n be a multivariate polynomial of total degree d(n) over K n . Then h = fh n g n 1 is t-privately, nonadaptively (1 + dt)-rsr.
Assume without loss of generality that log n divides n; if it does not, then x can be \padded" with dummy input bits. Divide the input bits x 1 ; : : :; x n into consecutive \blocks" of size log n. For example, if n = 4, then the rst block is fx 1 ; x 2 g and the second is fx 3 ; x 4 g. Proof of Lemma 4.4: The crux of this construction is a change of variables that allows us to use a total-degree-(n= log n) polynomial h n in n 2 = log n variables in place of the total-degree-n polynomial g n in n variables that was used in Theorem 4.1.
Let fx j g l logn j=(l?1) log n+1 , for each 1 l n= log n, be a block of input bits and fX j g l logn j=(l?1) logn+1
be the corresponding block of indeterminates over K n that are used to de ne the arithmetization g of f. For each subset S of the indices f(l ? 1) log n + 1; : : :; l log ng, let the variable W S represent the monomial j2S X j . There are n= log n blocks and hence a total of n 2 = log n variables W 1 , : : :, W n 2 =log n . Each monomial in g n can be represented as a monomial in n= log n of the W's. Let h n (W 1 ; : : :; W n 2 =log n ) be the total-degree-(n= log n) polynomial that results from summing these representations of all of the monomials in g n .
Proof of Lemma 4.5: Let h n (W 1 ; : : :; W s ) be a total-degree-d(n) polynomial over K n , and let w = (w 1 ; : : :; w s ) be an element of K s n . We show how to reduce w to a collection of 1 + dt elements of K s n with an appropriate distribution. The main idea of this construction is to use a random degree-t univariate polynomial for each W l instead of the random degree-1 univariate polynomial that was used in Theorem 4.1. Let 1 , : : :, 1+td be distinct elements of K n . For each 1 l s, choose t elements c l;1 , : : :, c l;t of K n independently and uniformly at random, and let q l (Z) = c l;t Z t + + c l;1 Z + w l . For 1 i 1 + td, the function maps (i; x; ran) to y i = (q 1 ( i ); : : :; q s ( i )). Then the univariate polynomial H(Z) = h n (q 1 (Z); : : :; q s (Z)) -9 -is of degree at most td and satis es H( i ) = h n (y i ) and H(0) = h n (w 1 ; : : :; w s ): The function recovers h n (w) by interpolating the polynomial H(Z) from the pairs ( i ; H( i )) and outputting the constant term.
This reduction has the instance-hiding property for the same reason that Shamir's secret-sharing scheme works S1]: For every l, t or fewer values of the random degree-t polynomial q l reveal no information about its constant term w l .
Remark 4.6 This can be improved (in the sense that the parameter k(n) can be reduced) to a t(n)-private, nonadaptive (1 + (nt(n)=c log n))-lrr, for any positive constant c, by increasing the block size to c log n (and the number of x j 's per block to n c ).
Remark 4.7 More generally, one can use block size l, which is not necessarily O(log n). This will result in a t(n)-private, nonadaptive (1 + t(n) dn=le)-lrr from f to polynomials h n of total degree dn=le in 2 l dn=le variables, but the reduction will take time 2 l poly(n). On input x, Ch rst makes the oracle query Q(x) to obtain Q's claimed value y for f(x). On all inputs x, Ch f (x) = CORRECT with probability at least 3=4. If y 6 = f(x), then Ch Q (x) = FAULTY with probability at least 3=4.
Note that the output of a checker may be CORRECT or FAULTY if Q(x) = f(x) but Q(x 0 ) 6 = f(x 0 ) for some x 0 6 = x. We say that f is checkable if it has a checker. We say that a set S f0; 1g is checkable if its characteristic function is checkable.
The following notion was rst de ned by Blum, Luby, and Rubinfeld. The de nition presented here, due to Babai, Fortnow, and Lund, is slightly more general and is better suited to a complexity theoretic treatment than the original de nition in BLR1].
De nition 5.2 BFL]:
The probabilistic polynomial-time oracle machines T and Co are a selftesting/correcting pair for f if they behave as follows. The output of T is always PASS or FAIL.
For all n, T f (1 n ) = PASS with probability at least 3=4. If the probability that T Q (1 n ) = PASS is at least 1=4, then for any x 2 I n , the probability that Co Q (x) = f(x) is at least 3=4.
Intuitively, the output of T, the tester, on input 1 n and oracle Q, is supposed to be PASS if Q is correct on I n , and it's supposed to be FAIL if Q is incorrect on I n . Formally, De nition 5.2 requires two things. The rst is that, if Q is in fact correct everywhere (i.e., if Q = f), then T outputs PASS with high probability. On the other hand, T may still output PASS if Q is incorrect somewhere. However, in this case, the second formal requirement says that, if T Q (1 n ) outputs PASS with any signi cant probability, then Co, the corrector, must be able to compensate for these errors in Q, i.e., Co Q (x) must be correct with high probability for any x in I n .
The following observation was made originally by Blum, Luby, and Rubinfeld. We include it here in order to demonstrate that it holds for the de nitions we are using here as well as for the ones in BLR1]. It is easy to see that Ch satis es De nition 5.1. If Q = f, then T will output PASS with high probability and Co Q (x) will be equal to f(x) (which is also equal to y) with high probability. If y 6 = f(x), then either T will output FAIL, or with high probability Co Q (x) will not be equal to y.
The next theorem has important consequences in the theory of multiprover, interactive proof systems, as we shall see in Section 6. Once again, this theorem was originally proven by Blum, Luby, and Rubinfeld; we include a slight modi cation of their proof in order to show that it holds for the more general de nitions used here as well as for the ones in BLR1]. One signi cant thing to note is that Blum, Luby, and Rubinfeld assume that the random-self-reductions are nonadaptive and that k, the number of random queries, is constant. As the following theorem shows, neither of these assumptions is necessary.
Theorem 5.4 If f has a downward self-reduction and a size-preserving rsr, then f has a selftesting/correcting pair.
Sketch of proof:
We construct a self-testing/correcting pair T, Co by induction on n. Let D be a downward self-reduction for f and R be the probabilistic polynomial-time machine in a sizepreserving rsr for f. The program Q will be used by D and R in place of the function f. If n = 1, then T and Co just compare the outputs of Q with values stored in a table. Assume that n > 1 and that T and Co have been correctly speci ed for inputs of size less than n.
On input 1 n and oracle Q, the tester T rst chooses an instance x 2 I n . It then repeats the following procedure m times, where m is a su ciently large polynomial in n. For each i, 1 i m, it uses D and R, together with T and Co on inputs of size less than n, to compute a candidate y i for f(x). If T outputs FAIL on some input 1 j , j < n, during any of these computations, then it also outputs FAIL on the original input 1 n . Otherwise, it outputs PASS if and only if y i = Q(x) for all i.
The candidate y i is computed as follows. Run the rsr R on input x. Suppose that z is an oracle query produced in this run. To compute f(z), run D on z and use T, Co, and Q to answer all oracle queries. That is, if z 0 is an oracle call made by D, and z 0 2 I j , rst run T Q (1 j ). If it outputs FAIL, then stop { the top-level call to the tester will be FAIL in this case. Otherwise, use Co Q (z 0 ) as the value f(z 0 ). This will be correct with high probability, because j < n. If R runs to completion, then its output is y i .
For any input x, the self-corrector Co simply outputs R Q (x).
Numerous examples of functions that have checkers and self-testing/correcting pairs can be found in Bl, Ka, Ru].
Question 5.5 Find other natural properties of functions that imply the existence of checkers or self-testing/correcting pairs.
6 Complexity-Theoretic Implications
In this section, we explore some of the complexity-theoretic consequences of the results discussed in Sections 4 and 5.
Theorem 6.1 All #P-complete functions are rsr. Proof: This follows easily from Theorems 4.1 and 4.2. Let PERM be the #P-complete function that computes permanents of integer-matrices. An instance x of PERM can be reduced to the computation of PERM(x) mod p j , for some small collection of primes p j { to recover PERM(x) from fPERM(x) mod p j g, use the Chinese Remainder Theorem. For each p j , PERM(x) mod p j is just a low-degree polynomial over a nite eld and is thus reducible to a polynomial-sized collection of random instances fPERM(y ij ) mod p j g. These y ij 's can be regarded as random instances of PERM { from the value of PERM(y ij ) over the integers, PERM(y ij ) mod p j can be found simply by reducing mod p j . In summary, the mapping from x to fy ij g is an rsr for PERM.
Let f be #P-complete. On input x of size n, the rsr for f proceeds as follows. Reduce x to one or more instances of PERM. Pad these instances if necessary so that their size depends only on n: For any l m, an m-by-m matrix M can be \padded" out to an l-by-l matrix M 0 with the same permanent by letting M 0 (a; b) = M(a; b), for 1 a; b m, M 0 (a; a) = 1, for m < a l, and M 0 (a; b) = 0, whenever a 6 = b and at least one of a and b is greater than m. Perform the above rsr of PERM. The random PERM-instances thus produced can be mapped back to f-instances, because f is #P-complete. These f-instances leak at most n, because the random PERM-instances leak at most n.
The proof of Theorem 6.1 illustrates a general principle about the random-self-reducibility of two functions that are ptime-equivalent. It is not necessarily the case that if f and g are ptimeequivalent and g is rsr leaking at most n, then f is rsr leaking at most n. We might try to obtain an rsr for f by reducing an f-instance to one or more g-instances, random-self-reducing these ginstances, and then reducing the random g-instances back to f-instances. However, this overall reduction may leak more than the size of the original f-instance: The reduction from f to g may be such that it maps f-instances x 1 and x 2 of the same size to g-instances y 1 and y 2 of di erent sizes; if this so, it may be possible to tell whether we started with x 1 or x 2 after the instance y i is randomized and mapped back to f-instances. However, if g is paddable, as the PERM function is in the above proof, this is not a problem { y 1 and y 2 can be padded so that their size depends only on the size of x i . The general principle is that if f and g are ptime-equivalent and g is paddable and rsr leaking at most n, then f is rsr leaking at most n. Proof: Let S f0; 1g be PSPACE-complete (resp. EXP-complete) and f n be the restriction to f0; 1g n of the characteristic function of S. Let g = fg n g n 1 be the arithmetization of f = ff n g n 1 over a suitable sequence of nite elds.
From Equations (1) and (2) in Section 4, it is clear that g is computable in polynomial space (resp. exponential time), because f is computable in polynomial space (resp. exponential time). (This requires that K n not be too big, but this is not a problem, because we can always choose K n to be of size polynomial in n.)
The rsr of S proceeds as follows. Let x be an element of f0; 1g n for which we wish to determine membership in S. Interpret x as an element y of Dom(g n ); this may be regarded as reducing f to g via the identity mapping. Map y to random g-instances y 1 , : : :, y n+1 using the standard rsr for lowdegree polynomials given in Section 4. For each y i , reduce the computation of g(y i ) to a sequence z i1 , : : :, z im of S-oracle queries. This is a polynomial-time reduction, because S is PSPACE-complete (resp. EXP-complete) and g is computable in polynomial space (resp. exponential time). Overall, the mapping from x to the z ij 's is an rsr for S.
Note that, because the reduction from f to g is the identity mapping, it is obvious that the overall reduction leaks at most n, and we need not worry about paddability of g. Feigenbaum and Fortnow FF] have also shown that MOD m P-complete sets are rsr, for every integer m > 1. (MOD 2 P is better known as P.)
Note that the overall reductions in Theorems 6.1 and 6.3 may be adaptive if f or S is Turing complete for #P, PSPACE or EXP but not truth-table complete. Similarly, the rsr for a PPcomplete set given by the proof of Theorem 6.2 will be adaptive.
Question 6.4 Are there natural examples of adaptive rsr's besides the ones for these complete sets and functions?
The crucial fact in the proof of Theorem 6.3 is that if g is the arithmetization of f and f is computable in polynomial space (resp. exponential time), then so is g. Clearly, this is true of many other complexity classes, such as exponential space and double-exponential time. Feigenbaum and Fortnow give a precise su cient condition on a complexity class under which the proof technique of Theorem 6.3 shows that complete sets or functions for that class are rsr { the condition is called #P-robustness; see FF] for details. The proof of Theorem 6.1 does not use this technique; indeed it is not known whether #P is itself #P-robust.
Theorems 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3 tell us something remarkable about average-case complexity of complete sets (or functions) in #P, PP, PSPACE, and EXP. For each such complete set S, there is a polynomial-time sampleable distribution D on instances such that S must be hard on average with respect to D if it is hard (for randomized algorithms) in the worst case; of course these sets are believed to be hard in the worst case, because they are complete for their respective classes. Furthermore, the proofs of these average-case hardness results are quite simple. Average-case hardness results for NP are often quite tricky Le] . Note that the rsr for the permanent over nite elds is a very direct reduction and produces uniformly distributed (although correlated) random instances. The reductions given by Theorems 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3 do not necessarily have these nice properties.
Question 6.5 Find direct, simple rsr's for #P-complete functions of interest, such as the integer permanent function restricted to 0/1 matrices. Do the same for PSPACE-complete sets.
We turn next to the consequences of the results of Sections 4 and 5 in the theory of multiprover, interactive proof systems.
De nition 6.6 BGKW]: A multiprover, interactive proof system for the set S is a collection (V; P 1 ; : : :; P k ) of shared-input, interactive Turing machines with the following properties (1) and (2). The probabilistic polynomial-time machine V is called the veri er, and the powerful players P 1 , : : :, P k are called the provers.
(1) If x 2 S, then (V; P 1 ; : : :; P k )(x) = ACCEPT with probability at least 2=3.
(2) If x 6 2 S, then for all provers P 1 , : : :, P k , (V; P 1 ; : : :; P k )(x) = REJECT with probability at least 2=3.
The class of sets with multiprover, interactive proof systems is denoted MIP. A one-prover, interactive proof system GMR] is one in which k = 1. The class of sets with one-prover, interactive proof systems is denoted IP. A function f has a multiprover (resp. one-prover), interactive proof system if its graph f(x; f(x))g does. The class of functions with multiprover (resp. one-prover), interactive proof systems is denoted FMIP (resp. FIP). Note that the provers in a multiprover, interactive proof system are, by de nition, allowed to toss coins. This ability is only needed, however, to obtain zero-knowledge proof systems GMR, BGKW] . For the rest of this section, we assume without loss of generality that the provers do not toss coins; this assumption still leaves open the possibility that the provers may gain some advantage by basing their answers in round l on all of the veri er's queries in rounds 1 through l ? 1. Our next theorem shows that this is not the case.
Theorem 6.7 FRS]: A set S (resp. function f) is in MIP (resp. FMIP) if and only if it has a one-prover, interactive proof system in which both the legitimate prover P and any cheating prover P are functional.
Sketch of proof: Suppose that (V; P 1 ; : : :; P k ) is an r-round, k-prover, interactive proof system for S. We construct an rk-round, one-prover system (V 0 ; P 0 ) with the desired properties. Let (a i1 ; : : :; a ir ), 1 i k, be the sequence of queries that V sends to P i during the execution of (V; P 1 ; : : :; P k ) on input x and random string ran. With the same input and random string, in round lk + i, 0 l r ? 1, V 0 sends to P 0 the query (a i1 ; : : :; a i;l+1 ). P 0 answers exactly as P i would have in the multiprover system. At the end of all of the interaction, V 0 has precisely the information that V has at the end of the interaction in the multiprover system, and V 0 accepts if and only if V would have. If x 2 S, then the legitimate P 0 obviously convinces V 0 to accept with exactly the same probability that P 1 , : : :, P k convince V to accept. Suppose that a cheating P 0 could convince V 0 to accept an x that is not in S. Recall that P 0 is functional. So his successful dishonest response in round lk + i must be based on the query (a i1 ; : : :; a i;l+1 ) and not on queries received in other rounds. Thus, we could construct cheating provers P 1 , : : :, P k who would succeed in making V accept x, because (a i1 ; : : :; a i;l+1 ) is exactly the information that the i th prover has in round l + 1. This is a contradiction, because (V; P 1 ; : : :; P k ) is a sound multiprover system for S.
Suppose S is accepted by the n k -round, one-prover system (V 0 ; P 0 ), and that both P 0 and any cheating prover P 0 are functional. We de ne a multiprover system (V; P 1 ; : : :; P n k+1 ) that accepts S. The veri er V rst randomly chooses an ordering of the n k+1 provers. V then simulates V 0 and whenever V 0 asks a question to P 0 , V asks the same question to each of the next n provers in the chosen ordering. If the provers are unanimous in their answer, V uses that answer in its simulation of V 0 ; if not, V rejects immediately. If the provers achieve unanimity on all queries, then V accepts if and only if V 0 does.
A complete proof that (V; P 1 ; : : :; P n k+1) is a correct multiprover system for S can be found in Fo] .
Note that the fact that the one-prover system is only secure against functional cheating provers gives it the power to recognize a set that may not be in IP { in IP, adaptive cheating provers must also be defeated.
Checker characterization theorem BK]:
A function is checkable if and only if it has a oneprover, interactive proof system in which the legitimate prover P computes f and any cheating prover P is functional.
Thus, if a set (resp. function) is checkable, it is in MIP (resp. FMIP). The connection between random-self-reducibility and FMIP, via checkability, gives a simple, high-level proof that large, interesting classes have multiprover, interactive proof systems. If we use Theorem 5.4 to show that f has a self-testing/correcting pair, then we have also shown that f 2 FMIP. If f is hard for complexity class C, then we have shown that C FMIP (but not that every function in C is checkable!). For example, it is immediate that all of #P is in FMIP: From the proof of Theorem 6.1, it is clear that the #P-complete PERM function has a size-preserving rsr; PERM also has a downward self-reduction, which consists of expansion by co-factors. This observation played an important role in the complete characterization of the power of interactive proof systems: IP = PSPACE (cf. LFKN, S2]), and MIP = NEXP (cf. BFL]). The random-selfreducibility of low-degree, multivariate polynomials also played a crucial role in the investigation of the power of two-prover, one-round interactive proof systems. A sequence of results culminating in those of Feige and Lov asz show that these MIP(2; 1) proof systems recognize all of NEXP; FL, Sections 1 and 2] gives the history of this problem and a proof of the nal result.
One way to interpret the fact that PSPACE-complete sets (or PP-complete sets or #P-complete functions) are checkable is that, in a multiprover, interactive proof system for such a set, the provers need only su cient power to decide membership in the set itself. (This is also true of EXP-complete sets, but not by the above argument { these sets are not downward self-reducible, unless EXP = BPPSPACE, which is in fact equal to PSPACE. See BFL] for a proof that EXPcomplete sets have self-testing/correcting pairs.) It is not known whether coNP-complete sets have multiprover, interactive proof systems in which the provers need only su cient power to determine membership in the set itself; we will return to this issue in the next section.
Negative Results
We now review the known limitations on random-self-reductions, locally random reductions, and instance-hiding schemes. There are many interesting open questions in this area.
The rst general negative result was proven by Abadi, Feigenbaum, and Kilian in the original paper on instance-hiding. Theorem 7.1 AFK]: If S has a 1-ihs, then S 2 NP=poly \ coNP=poly. Sketch of proof: First suppose that (A; B) is an r-round 1-ihs that has error probability 0. Thus, for any input x, player A always gets the right answer S (x), no matter which random string ran he uses.
For each input size n, choose an input x n in I n and a random string ran n 2 f0; 1g w(n) . Let t n = (a 1 ; b 1 ; : : :; a r(n) ; b r(n) ) be a transcript that players A and B could produce on input string x n and random string ran n . For every other x of size n, there must be at least one random string ran such that transcript t n is produced. Otherwise, the ihs would leak more than n.
The nonuniform, nondeterministic polynomial-time algorithm for S is now obvious. The advice for size n is t n . On input x 2 I n , the algorithm guesses ran 2 f0; 1g w(n) such that (A; B) produces t n , simulates the ihs, and returns the output of A.
If the ihs (A; B) is allowed to make errors, the advice must be more elaborate. For example, there may not be a single transcript t n with the property that, for every x 2 I n , there is at least one ran such that A outputs the right answer S (x) on input x, random string ran and transcript t n . We must show that there is a polynomial-sized set of transcripts, say T n , such that, for any x 2 I n , the majority of transcripts in T n produce the right answer on input x for the overwhelming majority of random strings ran. Furthermore, since NP=poly \ coNP=poly is not a probabilistic class, we need a way of verifying that a particular ran is in this overwhelming majority. Both of these constructions are given in full detail in AFK]. This follows directly from Theorem 7.1 and from the fact that the hierarchy collapses at the third level if NP is in coNP/poly (cf. Yap]). Note that the hierarchy collapses at the third level if any NP-hard function has a 1-rsr or a 1-lrr, because these are just special cases of 1-ihs's.
The question of whether NP-hard functions have k-ihs's, for some k > 1, was posed by Rivest.
We have already seen that the answer to this question is yes: Theorem 4.1 states that every boolean function on n variables has a nonadaptive (n + 1)-lrr, which is a special type of (n + 1)-ihs. An ihs for a non-boolean function f can be obtained by concatenating the ihs's for each output bit.
Beaver and Feigenbaum's general construction shows that there is an ihs for every function f. However, this construction does not answer the question of how much computational power must be used to answer the random questions. For example, in an lrr from f to g, how does the computational complexity of g compare with that of f? As discussed in Section 6, sets (or functions) complete for the complexity classes #P, PP, PSPACE, and EXP have rsr's. Thus, in those cases, the complexity of g is the same as that of f. What about complete sets of lower complexity, e.g., NP-complete sets? Feigenbaum and Fortnow have made some progress on this question. Let S be NP-complete. We will show that if S is nonadaptively rsr, then S (and hence all of coNP) is in AM/poly. To complete the proof, recall that AM=poly = NP=poly (cf. GS]) and that the hierarchy collapses at the third level if coNP is in NP/poly (cf. Yap]).
Let , be a nonadaptive k-rsr for S, where k = k(n) is a polynomially bounded function. As usual, we may assume without loss of generality that gives an incorrect value for the characteristic function of S with probability at most 2 ?n .
Consider instances x of size n. The veri er's advice is the k-tuple (p 1 ; : : :; p k ), where p i is the probability that a target instance (i; x; ran) is in S. The probability is computed over all coin-toss sequences ran.
We denote by Tr(x; ran) The following is an AM=poly protocol for S. Let m be a suitably large polynomial in k.
Arthur-Merlin game for S:
The quanti ers \for all 1 i k" and \for all 1 j m" are implicit whenever the subscripts i and j are used. For each j 6 = j 0 , ran j is independent of ran j 0 . V : Choose ran j . V ! P: fran j g. P ! V : A claimed value (y 1;j ; b 1;j ; w 1;j ; : : :; y k;j ; b k;j ; w k;j ) for ATr(x; ran j ). V : Accept i
(1) (x; ran j ; b 1;j ; : : :; b k;j ) = 0, (2) More than p i m ? 2 p km of the y i;j 's are in S according to P, and (3) If w i;j 6 = NIL, then it is a correct witness that y i;j 2 S. It is quite straightforward to show that, if x 2 S and P is honest, then V accepts with probability at least 2=3. So suppose that x 2 S and that a cheating prover P tries to convince V to accept x anyway. In order to succeed, P must send V messages that satisfy condition (1). Thus, either there is a j such that (x; ran j ; b 1;j ; : : :; b k;j ) is wrong when all b i;j are correct, or P must lie about at least one b i;j for each j. The probability that there is a j such that (x; ran j ; b 1;j ; : : :; b k;j ) is wrong when all b i;j are correct is exponentially small; so we must argue that, if P lies about at least one b i;j for each j, the probability that he meets acceptance condition (2), which he must do in order to get V to accept, is also su ciently small. If he lies about at least one b i;j for each j, then he tells a total of at least m lies, and there must be a particular i, say i 0 , for which he lies about at least m=k of the b i 0 ;j 's. Because he is required to provide a witness if he claims that y i 0 ;j 2 S, he can only lie by claiming that something is not in S when it really is. Thus the only way he can meet condition (2) for i 0 is if the real number of y i 0 ;j 's that are in S is more than p i m + m=k ? 2 p km. Cherno bounds su ce to show that the probability that Z i exceeds its expected value by more than m=k ? 2 p km is su ciently small.
Full details of this proof can be found in FF]. Feigenbaum and Fortnow also consider adaptive rsr's for complete sets in the polynomial-time hierarchy. Their de nition of adaptive rsr's is slightly more restrictive than the one we use here. In their de nition, the querier asks each of the powerful players exactly one random question. However, the negative result that they obtain is valid for our less restrictive de nition as well: If f has an r-round, adaptive k-rsr under our de nition, then f also has an r-round, adaptive rk-rsr under the de nition in FF]. In the following theorem, the number of powerful players k is an arbitrary polynomial, and thus the two de nitions are equivalent for purposes of the theorem. The proof of Theorem 7.4 has the same structure as that of Theorem 7.3. The heart of the argument is to show that if an NP-complete set has an O(log n)-round, adaptive rsr, then coNP is in AM/poly. The argument is trickier than in the nonadaptive case, because it is no longer true that a cheating prover can only lie by claiming that something is not in the set when it really is. By giving wrong answers to queries in earlier rounds of the reduction, the cheating prover may be able to force queries in later rounds to have the answers he wants. As long as r = O(log n), we can still design the proof system so that the veri er will catch a prover who tries to do this; see FF] for a more detailed explanation. Unfortunately, this technique does not say anything about adaptive rsr's in which the number of rounds is not O(log n).
Question 7.5 Do NP-complete sets have adaptive rsr's?
Part of the motivation for studying the question of whether NP-complete sets have rsr's is Theorem 5.4. These sets do have downward self-reductions; so if they had size-preserving rsr's, they would have checkers, as do the complete sets for PP, PSPACE, and EXP and the complete functions for #P. Of course, they might have checkers even if they do not have rsr's. Question 7.6 Are NP-complete sets checkable? More generally, if S is NP-complete, how powerful must the provers be in a multiprover, interactive proof system for S? How powerful must the single prover be in a one-prover, interactive proof system for S? Question 7.7 Do NP-complete sets have self-testing/correcting pairs?
Analogues of theorems 7.3 and 7.4 hold for complete sets higher up in the polynomial hierarchy, i.e., if S is complete for p i , and S has an O(log n)-round, adaptive rsr, then the hierarchy collapses at the (i + 2) nd level. Similarly, questions 7.5, 7.6, and 7.7 are valid for complete sets higher up in the hierarchy. These questions are also valid for sets in the hierarchy that are not complete. The following result is due to Beigel, Bellare, Feigenbaum, and Goldwasser. The proof given here is more concise than the one in BBFG] but uses the same basic idea. The complexity class EE consists of all sets in DTIME(2 2 O(n) ). NEE and BPEE denote the corresponding nondeterministic and boundedprobabilistic time classes. Theorem 7. 8 BBFG] : If NEE 6 BPEE, then there is an uncheckable set in NP. Proof: Assume that NEE 6 BPEE. A standard padding argument Bo] shows that there is a set S 2 NP n BPP such that S f0 2 l : l 0g. We show that if S were checkable, it would be in BPP.
Suppose that Ch were a checker for S. Assume without loss of generality that Ch's error probability is exponentially small. There is a xed polynomial p such that, on inputs of size n, Ch only queries the oracle about strings of size at most p(n). Because S is so sparse and has such a simple structure, a bit vector L of length log(p(n)) can completely describe all members of S that have size at most p(n).
The BPP machine N for S works as follows on input x of size n. Let L 1 , : : :, L p(n) be all of the (polynomially many!) possibilities for L. For each L i , N simulates Ch on input x, answering all oracle queries according to L i . As soon as N reaches a value of i for which Ch outputs CORRECT, N either accepts or rejects x, depending on whether L i says x is in S or not. If none of the simulations causes Ch to output CORRECT (a low-probability event by the de nition of checkability), then N rejects x.
Corollary 7.9 If NEE 6 BPEE, then there is a set in NP that does not have a self-testing/correcting pair.
Theorem 7.1 shows that there exist functions that do not have 1-ihs's, even if multiple rounds of queries are allowed. Theorem 4.3 shows that every function has a (1+(n= log n))-ihs, even if only one round of queries is allowed. There is obviously a big gap between these results { perhaps every function has a 2-ihs. In fact, no one has shown that this is not the case. Fortnow and Szegedy, building on previous work of Yao, have obtained the following partial result on the limitations of 2-ihs's. Theorem 7.10 FS]: If S is nonadaptively 2-lrr to (g1; g2), where g1 and g2 are boolean functions and the 2-lrr has error probability 0, then S 2 NP=poly \ coNP=poly. Sketch of proof: Let , be an errorless 2-lrr from S to boolean functions g1, g2. If y i = (i; x; ran) and z i = gi(y i ), i = 1; 2, we say that x, ran, and z i set S (x) if the value of z 3?i is not needed by in computing S (x). That is, (x; ran; z i ; 0) = (x; ran; z i ; 1) = S (x). We say that z i forces z 3?i through x and ran if x, ran, and z i do not set S (x). Note that the assumption that z 1 and z 2 are single bits in necessary for the notion of forcing to be well-de ned.
Let T = fx 1 ; : : :; x t g be a set of inputs in I n . The sequence y 0 , y 1 , : : :, y m is a forcing path with respect to T if: There exist x 0 2 T and ran 0 such that y 0 = (1; x 0 ; ran 0 ), y 1 = (2; x 0 ; ran 0 ), and g1(y 0 ) forces g2(y 1 ) through x 0 and ran 0 ; there exist x 1 2 T and ran 1 such that y 1 = (2; x 1 ; ran 1 ), y 2 = (1; x 1 ; ran 1 ), and g2(y 1 ) forces g1(y 2 ) through x 1 and ran 1 ; there exist x 2 2 T and ran 2 such that y 2 = (1; x 2 ; ran 2 ), y 3 = (2; x 2 ; ran 2 ), and g1(y 2 ) forces g2(y 3 ) through x 2 and ran 2 ; and so forth. That is, the appropriate g-values are all forced by g1(y 0 ) and by values of S on elements of T. The description of the forcing path consists of y 0 , y 1 , : : :, y m and the sequence of x j , ran j pairs.
On inputs in I n , the nondeterministic, polynomial-time algorithm for S will use as advice a starting point g1(y 0 ), a polynomial-sized subset T of I n , and the values of S at elements of T. On input x, the algorithm will guess a random string ran and a description of a forcing path with respect to T that starts at y 0 such that (1) z 1 = g1( (1; x; ran)) and z 2 = g2( (2; x; ran)) are both on this forcing path, or (2) z i is on the path and S (x) is set by x, ran, and z i .
It is clear how S (x) can be obtained by the algorithm but why must such a polynomial-sized set T exist? Fortnow and Szegedy give a recursive construction of T. The crux of their construction is the following expansion property. Suppose that T j = fx 1 ; : : :x j g and that U j Range( ) is such that every point in U j is on a forcing path with respect to T j of length at most j. Let x j+1 be an input in I n for which neither (1) nor (2) holds, and take T j+1 to be T j fx j+1 g. Suppose ran is a random string such that exactly one of y 1 = (1; x j+1 ; ran) and y 2 = (2; x j+1 ; ran) is in U j . If y i 2 U j , then y 3?i is forced by x i+1 , ran, and gi(y i ). Let U j+1 consist of all y 1 's and y 2 's obtained in this manner. Then jU j+1 j = 2jU j j, and every point in U j+1 lies on a forcing path with respect to T j+1 of length at most j + 1. If we repeat this doubling process t = poly(n) times, we can take T = T t and have U t = Range( ).
All of the details can be found in FS].
Corollary 7.11 If any NP-hard set is nonadaptively 2-lrr to (g1; g2), where g1 and g2 are boolean functions and the 2-lrr has error probability 0, then the polynomial-time hierarchy collapses at the third level.
8 Related Work
In conclusion, we discuss brie y several notions in interactive complexity theory that are related to those we've covered in more detail and give pointers to the relevant papers. The properties of an instance-hiding scheme and those of an interactive proof system can be combined in one set of interactive Turing machines. Such an instance-hiding proof system may also have the zero-knowledge property. Informally, a zero-knowledge, instance-hiding proof system is a set of private-input, interactive Turing machines in which the veri er is convinced of the truth of a statement, but the veri er does not learn the proof, and the provers do not learn what they are proving. Beaver, Feigenbaum, and Shoup formalize this notion and show that every set in NEXP has a perfect zero-knowledge, multiprover, instance-hiding proof system BFS] . Under the assumption that one-way permutations exist, Feigenbaum and Ostrovsky show that any set that has both a one-prover, interactive proof system and a 1-ihs in fact has a zero-knowledge, one-prover, instance-hiding proof system FO]. Blum, Luby, and Rubinfeld consider private, adaptive checkers, which are instance-hiding proof systems for f in which the legitimate prover is functional and is required to compute f but the cheating prover may be adaptive BLR2]. They show that any function that is rsr and downward self-reducible has a private, adaptive checker.
Yao de ned the notion of a coherent function Yao]. An examiner M for a function f is a probabilistic polynomial-time oracle machine such that M f computes f and, on input x, never queries the oracle about x. A function f is coherent if it has an examiner. Beigel, Bellare, Feigenbaum, and Goldwasser extend this notion to nonuniform examiners: A function is weakly coherent if it has an examiner that is given polynomial advice as well as probabilistic polynomial- time BBFG] . If f is checkable, it is coherent Yao], and it if is rsr, it is weakly coherent BBFG]. These connections are used in BBFG] to construct a function f that is uncheckable and non-rsr whose space complexity is slightly more than polynomial, i.e., f 2 FSPACE(n log n ). This is the best bound on such a function that has been proven without any complexity-theoretic assumptions. Feigenbaum, Fortnow, Lund, and Spielman FFLS] show that increasing the number of random queries makes random-self-reductions strictly more powerful; speci cally, they show that there are functions that are nonadaptively k-rsr but not adaptively (k ?1)-rsr. They also show that adaptive rsr's are strictly more powerful than nonadaptive rsr's, i.e., that there is a function that is not nonadaptively rsr but is adaptively rsr. Neither of these results relies on a complexity-theoretic assumption. Under the assumption that NEEE 6 BPEEE, they show that there is a set in NP that is not nonadaptively rsr but is adaptively rsr.
Finally, the notions of random-self-reducibility and self/testing-correction play a role in the recent, exciting results on probabilistically checkable proofs AS, ALMSS, FGLSS, LY]. By showing that all sets in NP have proof systems of a very restricted, communication-e cient form, one can conclude that certain classical optimization problems, such as chromatic number and clique number, cannot be solved approximately in polynomial time unless they can be solved exactly in polynomial time, i.e., unless P = NP.
